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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Summary

1. Major changes in the theory governing Soviet defense policy were formalized by Marshal Malinovskiy at the 22d party congress, in an exposition of views on the waging of a future war which he presented as "theses" of "Soviet military doctrine." As compared with the last previous authoritative statement on this subject--Khrushchev's 14 January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet--the new statement placed much greater emphasis on the feasibility and likelihood of surprise attack and a much higher evaluation on the role of conventional arms and mass armies in a future war. Malinovskiy took pains to blur the differences by crediting Khrushchev with having "laid the basis" of the doctrine. But the content of his statement, as well as its designation by the unusually formal title of "doctrine," indicated that something new in Soviet military affairs was being unveiled.

2. The new doctrine could be viewed as a vindication of positions which the military had long been espousing. In each of the areas in which Malinovskiy's statement revised or qualified concepts expressed earlier by Khrushchev, pressures for change had long been manifest in the military press. Military spokesmen had frequently indicated dissatisfaction with the troop-cut policy and the emphasis in Khrushchev's public pronouncements on nuclear rocket weapons to the detriment of other arms and services. And military theory had long since been developed to the point where many of the propositions being discussed in the military press were incompatible with views contained in Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech.

3. The new doctrine could also be viewed as ratifying an already existing situation in defense practice and theory. Changes that had taken place in Soviet defense policy, particularly during the summer of 1961, had served to bridge the gap between positions expressed in the military press and official policy well before the 22d party congress convened. The troop-cut policy had been suspended, the military budget had been increased, and nuclear testing had been resumed. Moreover, Khrushchev had publicly reversed his views on the role of conventional arms and ground forces in a future war--the sorest issue which his 14 January 1960 speech had created for the military.

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4. A guiding role for the doctrine over state policy in the sphere of defense was claimed with increasing directness by the military press during the spring and summer of 1962. This trend was linked in part with an increasing emphasis on the economic requirements of defense, focused particularly on the need for continued high-priority development of the defense-supporting industries. A variety of indications suggested that this increasing assertiveness of the military press on matters of defense policy was prompted by concern lest efforts might be made to relieve the worsening agricultural crisis at the expense of defense commitments. There was also evidence that the maintenance of a large standing army was an issue of particular concern in this connection.

5. An evolution in the image of the military leadership's role in policy formation seemed inherent in the evolution of the public presentation of the new doctrine. In building up the political import of the doctrine, the military press was at the same time building up a tacit claim for military authority in the framing of defense policy. The military propaganda in general has continued to contain the normal complement of subservient references to the party's predominant role in all aspects of Soviet life. But the trend discernible in military press treatments of the origins and functions of the new doctrine points toward an effort to use the doctrine as a lever on national policy, channeling and influencing that policy in the direction of military interests.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

I. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE

The statement of views on the nature of a future war which Malinovskiy introduced into his 22d party congress speech as "theses" of "Soviet military doctrine" seemed to carry a significance that was not fully acknowledged in the statement itself. In the first place, the use of the word "doctrine" was unusual. The term had been rarely used before in Soviet military literature, and then only in a loose generic sense, and almost always in reference to the military thought of foreign states. Malinovskiy's choice of the unfamiliar term thus seemd to imply that something new in Soviet military affairs was being unveiled.*

In the second place, the ideas contained in the statement differed markedly in several respects from ideas on the same subject advanced by Khrushchev in his 14 January 1960 speech to the Supreme Sovet. Thus, in

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* The traditional categories of Soviet military thought, defined by Marshal Bulganin in his speech on the 30th anniversary of the Soviet armed forces in 1948, were: "military science," which was concerned with all the factors--political, moral, economic--that govern the conduct and outcome of war; "operative art," which was concerned with the conduct of war on a large scale; and "tactics," which was concerned with the battle proper. The term "military doctrine" was not mentioned in these formulas. Nor is it defined in the LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA. It is mentioned only once in the encyclopedia in the section on "military science," and then in a pejorative sense: "That is why bourgeois military theoreticians either reduce military science to military doctrine, or limit it to questions of military art." (BSE, VIII, page 406).

The term "military doctrine" appears as the second meaning under the term "doctrine" in the SHORT DICTIONARY OF OPERATIONAL, TACTICAL, AND GENERAL MILITARY WORDS, published by the Ministry of Defense in 1958. The definition given there suggests a purely generic meaning: "Teachings or system of views concerning questions of waging war by a given state." The term appeared once in a title in MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL before the 22d party congress. But the article in question dealt with the historical discussions concerning a "single military doctrine" which occupied Frunze and other Soviet military figures during the 1920's, and, moreover, the title carried a footnote explaining that "the word 'doctrine' is of Latin origin; it means teaching, theory."

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effect, Malinovskiy's statement assumed the character of a reformulation of views enunciated by Khrushchev--a function which seemed beyond the appropriate province of the Soviet minister of defense.

Malinovskiy took pains to blur the differences. Giving Khrushchev the credit for having expounded the "concrete basic tasks of the armed forces and the direction of military construction," he went on to state that Khrushchev's analysis, in the 1960 speech, of the character of modern war "lies at the basis" of Soviet military doctrine. The notion of subservience was further heightened by Malinovskiy's reference to Khrushchev as "our supreme Commander-in-Chief"--the first of only two such references ever to appear in Soviet public statements.

Yet Khrushchev in 1960--unlike Malinovskiy now--had drawn a relatively reassuring picture of the Soviet defense outlook. Stressing the notion that a future war could only be waged with rocket-nuclear weapons, he had strongly implied at the same time that the Soviet Union's military power made it unlikely that the weapons would ever actually be used. He had argued on the same grounds that surprise attack was an unfeasible policy, since any state, providing only that it be "sufficiently large," would always retain a capability for striking back. Finally, he had argued that conventional armaments, including surface ships and aircraft as well as large standing armies, had become or were rapidly becoming obsolete, and hence could be dispensed with in the Soviet Union's defense establishment.

By contrast, the doctrine enunciated by Malinovskiy projected a sombre estimate. While retaining Khrushchev's notion that a future war would "inevitably acquire the character of a rocket-nuclear war," it refrained from softening this image with any of the offsetting conclusions that Khrushchev had offered. Where Khrushchev had deprecated the feasibility of surprise attack, Malinovskiy asserted that plans for a surprise attack were being prepared by the imperialists. Where Khrushchev had offered reassurance that the Soviet Union's retaliatory capability provided a powerful deterrence to war, Malinovskiy stressed the precariousness of the Soviet Union's security, asserting that "the main, the primary, and the most important general task of the armed forces is to be in constant readiness to repel a surprise attack by the enemy." Finally, where Khrushchev had deprecated the value of conventional arms and standing armies, Malinovskiy asserted flatly that "final victory in war can only be achieved by the joint action of all arms and services" and requires the employment of "mass, multi-million-man armies."

A tabulation of the basic differences between the two doctrines using Malinovskiy's enumeration as a point of departure, provides a measure

of the scale and direction of this shift in official thinking. The statements are presented below in abbreviated paraphrase form. Elements in Malinovskiy's speech which were not present, either explicitly or implicitly, in Khrushchev's earlier one are underlined.

Khrushchev, 14 Jan. 1960	Malinovskiy, 1 Nov. 1961
Character of Future War	
Rocket-nuclear	Rocket-nuclear
Initial Period	
Decisive results in first minutes. Targets: industrial/administrative centers, strategic areas. Unprecedented destruction, but USSR would survive.	Decisive results in shortest period. Targets: enemy armed forces, industrial and vital centers, communication junctures, everything that feeds war. Unprecedented destruction, but USSR would survive.
Role of Conventional Arms	
Defense potential not determined by numbers of soldiers. Air force and navy being "replaced." Bombers and "other obsolete equipment" being discontinued.	Despite decisive role of rocket-nuclear weapons, "we nevertheless come to the conclusion" that final victory can only be achieved by joint action of all arms and services. Future war will require mass multi-million-man armies.
Surprise Attack	
"Some" of our possible adversaries "inclined" toward notion of surprise attack. But surprise attack unfeasible. Any large state subjected to surprise attack will "always be able" to retaliate.	Imperialists are now preparing a surprise nuclear attack. The most important, the principal, the primary task of the armed forces is to be in constant readiness to reliably repel a surprise attack by the enemy and to frustrate his aggressive plans.

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In sum, the new doctrine added up to a major revision of the assumptions and estimates upon which Soviet defense policy had been ostensibly based. Though Malinovskiy did not specify the practical implications, they could be inferred from the key modifications that had been introduced into Khrushchev's prospectus. The estimate that surprise attack would be the means by which a new war would be launched could be expected to affect the pace and focus of Soviet force construction, lending greater urgency to the need for anti-missile defenses and counter-force capabilities. The assertion that a large standing army would be required in a future war could be expected to solidify the recent reversal of the troop-cut policy and to add new requirements for weapons and materiel to the already hard-pressed economy. Finally, the estimate that the imperialists were actively preparing for war could be expected to reinforce a generally militant posture in relations with the West--a condition favorable to the military policies mentioned above. In catchword terms, the defense posture which seemed to be implied in the new military doctrine could be characterized as hard, complex, and costly as compared with the reassuring, simple, and economical policy Khrushchev had offered in 1960 as a shortcut to national security.

II. THE ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE*

In each of the areas in which the new statement revised or modified Khrushchev's ideas, pressures for change had been long apparent. Military spokesmen had frequently indicated dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's troop-cut policy and his one-sided emphasis on nuclear-rocket weapons to the detriment of other arms and services. Military theory had long since been developed to the point where many of the propositions being discussed in the military press were incompatible with the views contained in Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech. These practical and theoretical positions, in turn, had been accompanied by signs that the military had aligned themselves with the broader conservative viewpoint which had developed after the January 1960 plenum in opposition to Khrushchev's plans to reorient the Soviet economy toward a greater concentration on welfare goals.

* Throughout this report the term "doctrine" is used as referring to the "theses" which Malinovskiy enunciated in his 22d party congress speech. It is in this sense that Soviet commentators themselves have subsequently used the term. Neither Malinovskiy nor these commentators, however, have implied that the "theses" represent the full body of principles underlying Soviet military thinking and defense policy.

Khrushchev had barely concluded his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960 before signs of resistance to some of its principal propositions began to appear in the statements of military spokesmen. Seeds of the opposing views that were to bear fruit in the new military doctrine were already present in the speech delivered by Malinovskiy on the same day. Just as the doctrine was later to emphasize a real and present danger of surprise attack, so in his Supreme Soviet speech Malinovskiy observed that "it is to be expected" that the most likely method of unleashing a war by the imperialists will be a "surprise" attack with the large-scale employment of nuclear arms. And just as the new doctrine was to enunciate the proposition that all arms and services are essential to victory, so Malinovskiy then asserted that "the successful carrying out of military actions in a modern war is only possible on the basis of a unified use of all types of armed forces."

In the months following the Supreme Soviet session, military spokesmen on a number of occasions managed to convey discreet reservations regarding details of Khrushchev's thinking while extolling the practical and theoretical significance of his speech as a whole. Reservations were most apparent regarding Khrushchev's evident intention to relegate conventional arms and the standing army to the limbo of military antiquities. The symbol of these reservations was the "combined arms" formula which began now to crop up with fair regularity in the utterances of military spokesmen. The point of view which it expressed was also reflected in other less obvious ways: references to the role of small unit actions in a future war, for example, and addition of the formula "troop concentrations" to Khrushchev's list of the probable targets of strategic strikes.

The issue of surprise attack--still entangled in Soviet military thinking with the long engrained habit of disparaging the German "Blitzkrieg" tactics--did not emerge as a point of contention during this period. The military's reservations regarding Khrushchev's policy were subdued, discreet, and indirect. But there seemed little doubt that in the eyes of the professional military officer Khrushchev's model of how a future war would be fought and won left something to be desired.*

The philosophical underpinnings of Khrushchev's program--the optimistic assumptions regarding the trend of world developments and the degree of security afforded the Soviet Union by the latest advances in rocket technology--were struck a blow by the U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Paris summit meeting. For a time after the U-2 incident,

* For a fuller analysis of these developments, see Radio Propaganda Report CD.163 of 8 April 1960, "The Impact of Khrushchev's Troop-cut Speech on Soviet Military Doctrine".

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Khrushchev seemed concerned to deny that any changes in Soviet defense or internal economic policies were required. In his 5 May speech to the Supreme Soviet he denied that the incident indicated an increased danger of war, and asserted that expenditures for defense would continue to be reduced in accordance with the troop reduction policy. And in his Czechoslovak embassy reception speech on 9 May he indicated that still further troop reductions might follow after the current program had been completed.

But in the months following the collapse of the summit meeting, indications accumulated that the Soviet official outlook on world developments had in fact been darkened and that corresponding modifications were being introduced into Khrushchev's defense prospectus. The last occasion on which Khrushchev publicly disparaged the effectivness of military aircraft (in an argument directed against the U.S. strategic air force) was on 12 July 1960. And Marshal Vershinen on 18 August 1960 referred to the introduction of "new" combat aircraft as standard equipment in the Soviet air force.

Hindsight throws light on another curious reference at the time--Khrushchev's allusion to the combined arms doctrine in his speech to the Soviet intelligentia on 17 July 1960. Comparing the Soviet Union's advance toward communism with a military campaign, Khrushchev said:

> In our campaign, as in the army, all kinds of troops are necessary and important. It is impossible to advance much less to win a war without engineers, without artillerymen, without infantry and other kinds of troops. Therefore, it is not worth quarrelling among us as to which is the more important and which the main [glavnoye]. This would be a useless and senseless quarrel. Each is important in his place if he fulfills his functions well; it is important that each always have his weapon sharply honed and directed at the goal.

The analogy was an apt one and may have had no more than rhetorical significance. Yet it is also possible that it reflected Khrushchev's preoccupation with a then current problem. The reference to quarrels over which should be the "main" seems particularly suggestive of a real current issue, since the USSR's Strategic Rocket Troops had only recently been officially designated the "main kind of troops."

Khrushchev's July speech was withheld from publication for almost a year--a fact which was hard to explain by anything the speech contained, least of all by this relatively harmless and ambiguous passage. But when it finally appeared--in abridged form, in KOMMUNIST, No. 7 in May 1961--the contrast between the views the military press was by then freely

publishing and the views Khrushchev had propounded in his defense reorganization policy were more apparent than ever. The issue of surprise attack had at last been squarely faced in the military literature in a debate which had been carried on in the pages of MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL over the preceding year. And the issue of the role of conventional arms and a standing army in a future war had been virtually conceded to the proponents of a large and diversified defense establishment.

Surprise Attack

One of the most authoritative expressions of the military attitude toward the significance of surprise attack was contained in an article by deputy chief of the General Staff General Kurasov, in MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 3, 1961. The article was devoted to a review and analysis of Lenin's works bearing on questions of military science--an exercise which, the author repeatedly emphasized, was directly relevant to current military problems. Identifying "surprise" as one of the questions which attracted Lenin's "great" attention, Kurasov treated it as both a potential advantage to be seized and a danger to guard against. In regard to the first aspect, he quoted Lenin: "It is necessary to strive to catch the enemy unawares, to seize the moment when his troops are dispersed." In regard to the second, he asserted: "Lenin constantly underscored the huge significance of discovering in good time the perfidious intentions and plans of the imperialists."

These points were made in the context of a discussion of the importance of an offensive spirit in war and of the need to master all kinds of weapons and methods of waging war. They were given still greater effect by the author's dilation, in the paragraphs which immediately followed, on the need to know the enemy. Pointing out that armies in the past had often suffered serious defeats due to underestimation of the enemy, Kurasov stressed the need not only to know the enemy but to learn from him. "Foolish and even criminal is the leadership of an army which is not prepared to employ all the weapons, all the means and methods of war, which are or could be employed by the enemy," he quoted Lenin as saying. This proposition, he emphasized, "acquires particular significance at the present time when fundamental changes in the means, forms, and methods of waging war are rapidly taking place."

Conventional Arms and Armies

This and other points in Kurasov's article were relevant also to the question of the military view of the role of conventional arms and mass armies in a future war. A more sharply focused comment on this question was contained in an article by Colonel S. Kozlov in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 11, 1961. Accepting in part the spirit of Khrushchev's January 1960, speech, Kozlov declared that the traditional postulate on

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By NLT NARA Date 8/20/09

the "harmonious" development of all arms and services should not be misinterpreted to mean "equal" development. And he asserted that the role of bombers had been "reduced." But when he came to the question of the numerical size of the ground forces, he directly contradicted the basic argument that Khrushchev had advanced in favor of the troop reduction policy. Where Khrushchev had argued that the increase of firepower afforded by modern weapons permitted the reduction of personnel, Kozlov now asserted that

> the might and variety of equipment/technology does not entail a sharp reduction of troops. Modern war requires mass, multi-million man armies.

Khrushchev had allowed for the possibility of reversing the troop-cut policy if war should become imminent or actually break out--and Kozlov carefully phrased his statement to apply to a war situation only. But this technical loophole does not reduce the flagrancy of the contradiction between the two positions, since Khrushchev's arguments on the ratio of firepower to personnel had no meaning except in the context of an assumed war situation. At the least, Kozlov's statement reflected the development of the military opposition to the troop reduction policy into a firm theoretical position.

Economic Priorities

Parallel with this opposition in the relatively narrow sphere of military theory, a broader opposition to Khrushchev's aims in the sphere of economic policy had also emerged. The point at issue here was the relationship between the heavy and light industry sectors of the economy. At the January 1961 plenum, Khrushchev had sought unsuccessfully to gain party endorsement of his plans to modify the traditional heavy industry bias of the economy in order to free a larger share of national resources for the satisfaction of consumer needs. While the plenum had indicated some sympathy for his proposals in the sphere of agriculture, it had withheld ratification of his broader plans for a general reorientation of the economy toward the consumer.

Khrushchev then took the issue to the broader political forum of the country by agitating for his plans in a series of public speeches and by permitting the party press to reveal that a party controversy had developed around the issue. Opponents of his views responded with a press agitation of their own. During the spring and summer of 1961, virtually open polemics developed between the advocates of consumer interests and the opponents of any diminution of emphasis on heavy industry.*

* For an analysis of this debate, as well as for background on the issue as a whole, see Radio Propaganda Report RS.48 of 21 November 1961, "Soviet Policy Dispute Over Resource Allocation."

The relevance of this debate to military interests was rooted in the parallel history of Khrushchev's defense and economic policies. From the beginning Khrushchev had given indications that there was an organic connection between his estimate, on the one hand, that manpower strength could be reduced without detriment to the security of the country and his proposal, on the other hand, that additional funds, including the savings derived from manpower reductions, could be directed to the consumer sector of the economy. Even in his 14 January speech--where there was every political reason to minimize the role of economic considerations in the troop-cut proposal--Khrushchev referred to the "most tangible saving" which would contribute to the "fulfillment and overfullment of our economic plans." In his 17 January speech to the plenum he directly linked his argument for increased attention to the consumer sector of the economy with the estimate that "the defenses of the Soviet country are reliable; we can crush any enemy in the event that he tries to attack us." And in his 5 May speech to the Supreme Soviet he again linked the prospects for improving the people's welfare with the decline in the defense budget brought about in part by the troop reduction policy.

The evident military opposition to the troop reduction policy thus carried with it an implicit opposition to Khrushchev's broader schemes in the sphere of internal economic policy. Moreover, some explicit expressions of military sympathies for the heavy industry position made their appearance in the military press during this period. References to the importance of heavy industry for the defense of the country and to the classical dogma on the "preferential development of the means of production" cropped up in articles published for officers' study courses. One author, for example--A. Notkin, in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 8--found occasion, in the course of a discussion of the social division of labor in the period of building communism, to reiterate the "well known" proposition that "the preferential growth of the production of the means of production" is the main condition of technical progress. Pointing out that technical progress and automation would lead to a quick rise in consumer industries, the author at the same time argued that this would not lead to any diminution in the share of the social product devoted to heavy industry. In fact, he said, heavy industry (that is, "the production of the means of production") will continue to absorb the greater share of the social product.

Another article in the June issue (No. 12) of the same journal argued the case for heavy industry from a more practical viewpoint, adding what seemed to be a pointed political moral:

> Contemporary military technology presents increased demands on a whole number of branches of heavy industry. Thus, for example, hundreds of enterprises participate in the production

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> of military aircraft, tanks, and ships. A still broader circle of enterprises is involved in the preparation of rocket weapons. Only a first-class industry can supply the different mechanisms, tools, and weapons with which the different arms and services are equipped.

References such as these cannot be demonstrated to have been politically motivated. But they bore so directly on issues which were then under public controversy that political motivation seems a reasonable presumption.

A more direct and unequivocal expression of military views was conveyed in several articles dealing with the military-theoretical question of the role of the economic factor in war. The major contribution was by General Kurasov in the article in the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL discussed above. Asserting that Lenin's works contained a storehouse of valuable insights for military science and military art today, Kurasov drew particular attention to Lenin's views on the role of the economic factor in war. Kurasov's interpretation of Lenin's views seemed to add up to an argument against the image of a rapid push-button war that Khrushchev had drawn in his January speech.

This impression was heightened by the way in which Kurasov presented Lenin's views. He seemed to take particular pains to select quotations which carried a sharp polemical cast. "As everyone knows," he quoted Lenin as saying, "economic organization has the decisive significance in modern war." Again he quoted: "In this war [the Civil War] as in any war, economics decides--this also is well known and no one can dispute this fact in principle."

Enumerating Leninist propositions which, he said, "have not lost their relevance even in our day," Kurasov specified the following points:

+ The need for economic superiority over potential enemies. He quoted Lenin as saying: "War is implacable; it poses the question with merciless rigor: either die, or catch up with the advanced countries and overtake them also in the economic sphere."

+ The vital importance of heavy industry. "Lenin saw the development of heavy industry and particularly machine-building as the basis of military power."

+ The need for thorough organization and preparation for war. "Very important are the propositions of Lenin concerning the economic organization of the country, the unity of rear and front, the timely preparation of the economy for armed struggle, the mobilization of all the resources of the country for the purposes of war."

These points were reiterated in a different way in an article by B. Uzenyev in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 6, 1961. Implicit in this article was the argument that the Soviet Union requires the maximum possible expansion of heavy industry, specifically in steel producing capacity, to maintain permanent military superiority. Uzenyev argued that the basis of military might (assuming a prolonged intensive war with nuclear weapons) is the economic and social-political system of the state; he mentioned that steel-producing capacity is a basic factor of economic strength; and he emphasized the need for an accurate appraisal of a potential enemy's economic and industrial capacity. Appraising the relative military power of the United States and the Soviet Union in this light, he concluded that the latter's social-political advantages--and the corresponding weaknesses of a capitalist state--have the effect of tipping the military-economic scales in favor of the Soviet Union. However, he also stated that

> at present the United States has the strongest steel production in the world; its production capacity...greatly exceeds the capacity of the USSR.

In the context of the argument as a whole, the practical conclusion that seemed implied by this comparison was that the Soviet Union should seek to catch up with the United States in steel producing capacity. And Uzenyev's readers would be aware that a first step in this direction might be the reinvestment in steel production of the above-plan profits which Khrushchev was proposing to channel into consumer industries.

The argument that the economic factor was decisive in war was reiterated in the lead editorial of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 7, which came out on the eve of Lenin's anniversary.

> V.I. Lenin pointed out that the defense of the Soviet republic constantly demands serious economic preparation--a condition essential to the waging of modern war. He particularly distinguished the role of heavy industry and transport, and repeatedly underlined the importance of the rear, the transformation of the country in a time of severe danger into a single armed camp.

This reminder of Lenin's views on war seemed a discordant note in an article otherwise devoted to Lenin's theoretical contributions to the "triumph of Marxism-Leninism."

Policy Changes in Summer of 1961

The changes in Soviet defense and economic policies accompanying the sharpening of the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961 moved in a direction

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that seemed to correspond with the desires long expressed in the military press. The new draft party program enshrined a harsh view of Western intentions as well as a "sacred" commitment to the "strengthening" of the armed forces and a promise to maintain "all types of military equipment and weapons" at the necessary level. Beginning in July, and continuing in rapid succession, a series of measures was enacted that had the effect of suspending Khrushchev's 1960 policies in favor of a defense posture more in line with the views that the military press had been developing. The troop-cut policy was "temporarily" suspended, appropriations for defense were increased by one-third, the regular release of servicemen into the reserves was deferred, and the resumption of nuclear testing was announced.

This confluence of policy with military views on the practical level was accompanied by moves by Khrushchev on the psychological level evidently calculated to conciliate military opinion. In the speech in which he first foreshadowed the practical measures mentioned above,* Khrushchev went out of his way to identify himself with the military viewpoint. Appearing in a Lieutenant General's uniform for the first time in three years, Khrushchev included in his speech a statement

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* In his speech of 22 June, celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Nazi invasion, Khrushchev had said that the Soviet Union might be forced

> to increase its allocations for armaments to strengthen and improve our defenses and, if necessary, also increase the numerical strength of our armed forces in order to insure peace and peaceful coexistence with the support of our might.

Speaking of nuclear testing, he had said that

> a great number of mechanisms have been worked out in the Soviet Union which demand practical testing. Of course, such testing will increase the fighting capacity of our armed forces, will enable us to create even better atomic and hydrogen bombs, and will give us an opportunity to improve the process of their production.

This remark was placed in the context of a conditional threat only, that is, one that would be implemented if the United States resumed testing first. But it conveyed the impression that a resumption of testing would be particularly advantageous to the Soviet Union at that time--an impression that may have been calculated to buttress the threat, but that might also have registered pressures being generated by Soviet scientific and military experts. Khrushchev had indicated that such pressures existed in his interview with columnist Drew Pearson in July.

announcing his concession to the military on the major issue which his troop-cut policy had raised. Addressing the armed forces directly, Khrushchev said:

> The strengthening of the defenses of the Soviet Union depends on the perfection of all services of our armed forces--infantry and artillery, engineering corps and signal corps, armored tank divisions and the navy, the air force, and the missile forces.

With this testimonial on this sensitive and symbolic issue, the armed forces would seem justified in believing that a decisive turn in their favor had been taken.

Yet Khrushchev's own statements at the time suggest that he regarded the developments of the summer of 1961 as a temporary turn only rather than as a decisive reversal of his policies. In announcing the suspension of the troop-cut and the increased appropriations for defense in his speech to the military graduates on 8 July, he had very carefully explained that the measures were "temporary" only and purely responsive in nature. He seemed concerned to stress the notion that the measures would be rescinded as soon as evidence of a corresponding willingness to relax tensions was offered by the United States.

In his radio-television speech of 7 August he was even more explicit in defining the political purposes behind the measures. Speaking of those that had already been taken as well as others that might be forthcoming, he asked:

> Why does the Soviet Government consider such measures? These are measures in the nature of a reply.... The experience of history teaches: When an aggressor sees that no rebuff is given to him he grows more brazen, and, conversely, when he is given a rebuff he calms down. It is this historic experience that should guide us in our actions.

This conception of the measures as moves in a political game rather than as steps toward a comprehensive policy reorientation seemed consistent also with Khrushchev's hope, expressed some weeks later in his interview with Sulzberger, that both the United States and Russia should revoke the orders given to strengthen the military forces.

Whatever Khrushchev's real attitude toward the defense measures of 1961, his freedom to halt or reverse the course of developments was diminished as each new step was taken. With the exception of the decision to defer

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the release of servicemen into the reserves--a step which had an immediate effect in augmenting armed forces strength--all the other measures required time for their fulfillment. They looked to the future for implementation and hence tended to commit the Soviet Union to a program of considerable duration.

Also contributing to the same effect was the increasingly hostile portrayal of the West which emerged as the political and ideological justification of the new defense measures. Unlike previous "lines" which could be switched on or off with little embarrassment to the political leaders, this one was given a relatively intractable quality by being imbedded in the new draft party program which came out at that time. For example, the program stated:

> The imperialist camp is preparing the most terrible crime against humanity--a world thermonuclear war, which can cause the most unprecedented destruction of entire countries and destroy whole nations.

That this formula was devised expressly for the program is suggested by the fact that no trace of it could be found in key party and military newspapers and journals for at least three months prior to the publication of the program. Its effect was to crystallize an assumption that would support the policy trends then in progress.

Whether or not military influence played a role in devising the formula, military interests were clearly served by it. Malinovskiy's new doctrinal thesis that "the imperialists are preparing...a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries," for example, was clearly supported by it. Moreover, since the 22d party congress, which sanctioned the formula in its resolutions, military spokesmen have reiterated it with fair regularity. Malinovskiy, for example, has used it twice: once in his interview with NEPSZABADSAG, on 4 April 1962, and again in his article in KOMMUNIST, No. 7, 1962.

Other examples of military use of the formula or the estimate which it expressed are contained in the statements by Marshals Chuykov, Yeremenko, and Bagramyan on Armed Forces Day 1962, and in those by Reserve General Martirosyan and Colonel General Alekseyev on Victory Day 1962. That these references reflected a special military interest in cultivating the notion that a real threat of war existed has been suggested by the fact that no comparable interest in the formula was shown by the civilian leaders. While the formula was mentioned by PRAVDA on May Day 1962, only

two Presidium members have used it in their speeches: Kozlov, in Pyongyang on 19 September 1961, and Grishin, before the WFTU on 4 December 1961.

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To summarize the situation as it had developed by the eve of the 22d party congress, considerable evidence had accumulated that military spokesmen were espousing views that diverged sharply from the economic and military policies inaugurated by Khrushchev in 1960. In the field of military theory, military spokesmen had evinced a belief in the feasibility of surprise attack and in the continued indispensability of conventional arms and mass armies in a future war. In the field of economic policy, they had aligned themselves with the opponents of Khrushchev's consumer oriented policies by stressing the need for a comprehensive economic preparation for war. In the field of relations with the West--an area in which military views could not be distinguished with certainty from those of any other group--they had at least demonstrated consistency in cultivating an image of the West which was compatible with their preferences in defense and economic policy. In sum, the military were no longer operating under the theoretical principles which professedly governed Soviet defense policy. The stage was set for a fundamental reformulation of these principles.

III. THE NEW DOCTRINE APPLIED TO POLICY

In describing the new Soviet military doctrine to the 22d party congress, Malinovskiy acknowledged none of the theoretical and political developments that had preceded it. Despite the obvious relevance of the doctrine to key questions of state policy, Malinovskiy made it appear as though its operative significance was limited mainly to the military sphere. In only two instances did he specifically identify practical policy implications of the doctrine. First, in connection with the thesis on the joint operation of all arms in a future war, he said: "This is why we are giving necessary attention to the improvement of all types of weapons and teaching the troops to handle them skillfully." Secondly, in connection with the thesis on surprise attack, he said: "Thus we are forced to prepare our armed forces, the country, and all the people primarily for a struggle against the aggressor mainly in the conditions of nuclear warfare."

Malinovskiy's exposition thus left it unclear whether the new doctrine was intended to govern party and state policy in the sphere of defense, or whether it was intended simply to guide military planning and troop training.

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This ambiguity persisted in propaganda references to the doctrine over the next several months. The doctrine was mentioned in RED STAR on 12 December 1961, in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES in the last issue of 1961 and the first two issues of 1962, and again in most of the statements celebrating Armed Forces Day 1962. In none of these references was there any substantial departure from the exposition as given by Malinovskiy. For the most part, the authors simply mentioned the existence of the doctrine and stressed the importance of one or another of the theses contained in it.

Substantial changes in the military press treatment of the doctrine began to appear in the spring of 1962. Accounts of the doctrine became fuller, more explicit, and more frequent, as though a concerted effort were being made to propagandize its existence and its meaning. The relevance of the doctrine to state policy was more clearly defined, and the primacy of the doctrine in this relationship was asserted with increasing directness. At the same time, and in part interwoven with these developments, the military press began to place increasing emphasis on the economic requirements of defense--an emphasis which seemed to express concern lest nonmilitary claimants on national resources detract in any way from the priority development of defense-supporting industries or the maintenance of a large standing army.

Stress on Economic Foundations of Military Strength

This shift in tone in the military press could be dated from the time of the March plenum--a coincidence in time which suggests an explanation of the ensuing propaganda phenomena. In highlighting the dimensions of the agricultural crisis and in pointing the way toward a practical solution of the problem--the allocation of additional resources--the March plenum set the stage for an intensified competition for funds throughout the Soviet Government. The resolution authorizing the Presidium and Council of Ministers "to find additional investment capital" for certain specified industries supporting agriculture in effect served notice that a hard scrutiny of existing and planned claims on the national budget would be undertaken. As the largest institutional claimant on national resources, whose interests were affected not only by the size of its departmental appropriations but by the pace and direction of the economy as a whole, the military department would naturally be sensitive to the implications of such a scrutiny. Whatever its position on the particular agricultural problems under review, it would certainly prefer that they be solved without detriment to its own immediate interests.

Against this background, the new stress on the economic components of defense assumes the aspect of a military argument designed to forestall any possible efforts to solve the agricultural crisis at the expense of defense commitments. The argument included several elements: repetitions

of classical formulas expressing the traditional commitment of the economy to the priority development of heavy industry; expositions of the relationship between defense and the economy, slanted to stress the need for comprehensive industrial development; and reiterations of the need for a large standing army. In content the individual items were neither unorthodox nor manifestly partisan, but in combination they developed a consistent point of view--an impression which was the stronger because no corresponding trend was apparent in the nonmilitary press.

The first signs of the new trend appeared shortly after the conclusion of the March plenum, in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES (No. 7). The lead editorial (which was devoted to Lenin), in describing Lenin's contributions to the industrialization of the country, inserted the following definition of heavy industry: "the base of the base of the economic power of the motherland, the cornerstone of its invincible defense capability." An article later in the same issue elaborated on the theme. Recalling that the party and the country had always taken care to provide for the technological equipment of the army and navy, it declared: "The tempestuous development of heavy industry, of science and technology, guarantees the economic power of our country, and at the same time serves as the basis for the constant renewal of military technology, for the strengthening of the fighting efficiency of the armed forces."

In May, this emphasis on the economic requirements of defense began to be incorporated into expositions of the new military doctrine. An article by Colonel General Lomov, entitled "On Soviet Military Doctrine," which appeared in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES (No. 10), provided a demonstration of this linkage. Identifying economic potential as the first and most important of the factors that decide the course and outcome of a war, Lomov described the practical conclusions that derive from this fact. "The successful conduct of modern war," he said, "cannot be based on strategic and state reserves that have been prepared ahead of time. There is necessary also a solid economic base capable, particularly in case of a prolonged war, of guaranteeing the military needs of the country on the basis of large scale production."

Lomov went on to specify, in some detail, the components of industry necessary to satisfy these requirements. He then argued that the economic potential of states, along with their moral-political potential, had acquired greater importance at the present time than ever before. This, he explained, was because contemporary means of armed struggle can be created only on the basis of "an exceptionally high level of development" of the economy, science, and technology. Finally, he went so far as to assert that Soviet policy in the sphere of defense was guided by these conclusions of military theory. "From an analysis of these basic factors," he said, "flow the concrete functions of the Soviet state in guaranteeing the security of our country...."

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This argument was developed further in an article by V. Sinyagin in the July issue (No. 14) of the same journal. Propounding the thesis that military power depends on the level of development of the economy, Sinyagin closed the syllogism by implying that military requirements should govern the development of the economy. Enumerating in turn the theses of the new military doctrine, Sinyagin defined for each the practical economic conclusions that derive from it.

- First, since war will acquire a rocket-nuclear character: "This dictates the necessity of developing and perfecting the different branches of industry which supply our Armed Forces with the most modern means of armaments."

- Second, since targets will include industrial and administrative centers: "In this connection there arises the very acute problem of preserving the viability of the economy during the whole course of military operations by a wise deployment of industrial production over the territory of the country, and by the creation of the necessary state reserves, etc."

- Third, since the joint action of all types of troops will be necessary: "Therefore, before the Soviet state stands the task of providing the Armed Forces with all the means necessary for the conduct and victorious outcome of the war." And, finally, since war will be conducted by mass armies: "In such conditions, the demand for military materiel, armaments and military equipment will grow significantly."

Sinyagin argued that heavy industry is not only an essential element of defense capability, but that it constitutes the most precise indicator of the military-economic power of a country. Heavy industry, he said, "defines the tempo and scale" of the technological equipment of the army. It affects even the organizational structure of the army, since the development of new weapons requires the creation of corresponding military components to employ them.

Sinyagin drew the connection between defense requirements and heavy industry so tightly that he even rephrased the classical formula on the preferential development of heavy industry to focus it more sharply on the defense-supplying industries. This emphasis appears the more significant in the light of the effort that Khrushchev had made at the 22d congress to point up the fact that the "heavy industry" category included activities directly or indirectly related to consumer requirements. KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES itself, in its lead editorial on the 22d congress (in issue No. 23, 1961) had emphasized this distinction. Pointing out that the country had been forced at one time to devote primary emphasis to enterprises of the first type, that is, those

producing the means of production, it asserted that now the role of heavy industry is manifesting itself in a new way in the growth of the people's welfare. "We now have," it said, "the possibility of significantly increasing capital investments also in enterprises of the second type...."

According to the new reading by Sinyagin, however, "the strengthening of the defense power of our state is realized on the basis of the preferential development of the most important branches of heavy industry. Among them are the electric power, tool-making, and chemical industries, metallurgy, machine-building, etc."

A still more striking indication of military concern with the economics of defense was Marshal Malinovskiy's article in issue No. 7 of KOMMUNIST, signed to the press on 15 May. Stressing the danger of aggression from the West and the need for continuing development of Soviet military capabilities, Malinovskiy vigorously defended the costs of the Soviet defense programs. Arguing that Soviet defense expenditure should not be compared with the policy of "militarization" pursued by the Western powers, Malinovskiy explained that while the latter consumed the budget, enriched the monopolists, and impoverished the workers, Soviet expenditures were dictated by legitimate state needs. The situation in the world is such, he asserted, that expenditures for defense are "absolutely necessary," and the Soviet people welcomed them. He then stated:

> To this one must add that, with us, military expenditures are strictly regulated. In the Soviet Government there is not and cannot be an exaggeration [razduvaniya] of military expenditures; our government carries out all measures for strengthening defensive might within the limits called forth by the actual requirements for defense of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries from imperialist aggression.

This excursus on the rationale of Soviet military spending had no known precedent in Soviet public utterances. That it was argumentative seemed evident from the content. The notion that defense expenditures might be "exaggerated" would hardly be raised in the propaganda--even if only to deny it--unless there were a compelling reason to do so. The hypothesis that it may have been designed to prepare the populace for the forthcoming price increases would hardly seem a sufficient reason: in fact, when the price increases were announced the propaganda contained no such justification. Whatever the interpretation--even the most conservative--Malinovskiy's statement gave eloquent testimony that the military budget had become a sensitive issue to the military leadership.

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The Issue of a Large Standing Army

Elsewhere in his article, Malinovskiy gave hints that this sensitivity was related particularly to the question of maintaining a large standing army.* In discussing the new Soviet military doctrine, Malinovskiy placed unusual emphasis on the notion that a future war will require mass armies. The notion had been expressed in virtually the same terms in his 22d party congress speech, but there he had placed it in the context of a balanced presentation of the other elements of the doctrine. The peculiarity of the present statement was that it was the only element of the doctrine that he emphasized. Moreover, the substance of the argument was reiterated in another place in the speech where Malinovskiy asserted that in constructing the armed forces

> the party is forced...to adhere to the principle of maintaining a cadre regular army which by virtue of its composition, numerical scale, and degree of preparation would be able from the beginning of a war to repulse an attack and destroy the aggressor.

Further evidence that the maintenance of a large standing army was a matter of concern to the military at this time could be seen in greatly increased attention to the history of the 8th party congress in the military press. No event in Soviet military history was more directly relevant to the question of the role of the professional soldier in the Soviet system than the 8th congress. Reduced to its essentials, the military question at the congress involved a controversy between Trotsky, who favored the establishment of a highly disciplined, professional army, and the "military opposition," which favored a "partisan"-type army based on the territorial-militia system. The congress, following Lenin's lead, resolved the controversy by a compromise. The territorial-militia

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* That the issue of a large standing army might be involved in any controversy within the Soviet Government affecting the military budget can be deduced from Soviet statements regarding the size of the manpower item in the military budget. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960, Khrushchev asserted that the reduction of military manpower by 1.2 million would result in savings of 16 to 17 billion rubles (presumably over the next two years). The announced military budget for 1960 was 96.1 billion rubles. However misleading these figures may be as indicators of the real composition of Soviet military expenditures, they at least reveal that the manpower item would be an inviting and substantial target in any search for investment capital within the Soviet Government.

system was acknowledged to be the best "theoretically," but a "standing" "regular" army was adjudged to be required due to practical necessity. "To preach partisan methods as a military program," said the resolution of the 8th congress, "is the same as recommending a reversion from large industry to cottage handicraft."

The symbolic significance of the congress was additionally apt in that it drew subtle attention to the anachronistic character of Khrushchev's suggestion, in his January 1960 speech, that the Soviet Union might go over to the "territorial-militia" system. In repeated references to the 8th congress during this period, the military press stressed the notion that the regular standing army was inspired by Lenin and that its maintenance was required by contemporary conditions. MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 2, 1962, quoted Lenin: "Now at the forefront should be a regular army; it is necessary to go over to a regular army with military specialists." RED STAR stated on 18 April 1962: "V.I. Lenin profoundly substantiated the party policy with regard to the building of a regular army." KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 12, 1962 said:

> After the ending of the civil war our party, not denying the possibility of a transition to a socialist militia in the future, proceeded from the fact that in the given period, the basis of the military organization of the Soviet state should consist of cadre armed forces.... The Soviet Union is forced to maintain a standing--cadre--army, recruited on the basis of universal military obligation.... Only a standing, highly-organized, disciplined and mobile Soviet army and navy is capable of mastering modern weapons and guaranteeing a high degree of battle readiness.

These indications in the propaganda that the question of military manpower had become an issue in the regime's efforts to relieve the agricultural crisis were supported by the coincidence in the announcements of two major regime decisions affecting both these questions. On 1 June the Central Committee and Council of Ministers announced an increase in the prices of a list of agricultural products, explaining that this was the only way of raising necessary funds for agricultural investment without detriment to defense commitments. On the same day, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decreed the lowering of the draft age from 18 to 17, thus insuring the maintenance of force levels in a period of tightening manpower availability. While an organic connection between the two decisions cannot be demonstrated, the presumption is strong that they were coordinated in the light of considerations relevant to both.

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Relevance of the Doctrine to State Policy

Meanwhile, expositions of the military doctrine were exhibiting subtle changes which seemed to reflect the more assertive tone that the military press had been demonstrating in the field of defense policy. Whereas at the beginning the doctrine had been presented as being little more than a projection of party ideas into the military sphere, it was now being implied that the doctrine was the product of military ideas and that its function was to guide rather than merely implement state policy. The propaganda in general continued to contain the normal complement of subservient references to the party's predominant role in all aspects of Soviet life. But the implication of a new role for the military was apparent in descriptions of the doctrine's origins and in the identification of its functions.

As late as March, articles in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES were still ascribing to the party direct responsibility for the creation of the doctrine. An article by Glazov and Zheltikov, in issue No. 6, spoke of the doctrine as having been "worked out by the Central Committee of the party." An article by Prusanov, in issue No. 7, used virtually the same formula.

In April, an article by Demidov in issue No. 9 described the origins of the doctrine in a way which seemed to distribute the credits equally between the party and the army. Demidov asserted that the "elaboration" of the doctrine was a clear testimony to the fruitful development of Soviet military "science," a sphere of endeavor which he had just previously assigned to "the leadership of the Communist Party, the common efforts of Soviet military leaders, and the collective labor of staffs and military establishments." In the next issue, an article by Lomov took a similarly ambivalent position. In one place he stated that the doctrine expresses the views "which have been adopted in our country and Armed Forces." In another place he spoke of the "leadership" of the Central Committee, and "its immediate control" over the working out of the doctrine, but he nowhere attributed direct authorship to it. An article by Sinyagin in issue No. 14 avoided the question entirely. A noncommittal attitude was also taken by Sidelnikov in the major article on the doctrine to appear during this period, in the 11 May issue of RED STAR.

A similar development was discernible in the treatment of the functions of the doctrine. In his original exposition of the doctrine at the 22d party congress, Malinovskiy had given vague indications that the purpose of the doctrine was to guide state policy in the preparation of the country and armed forces for a possible future war. But this aspect of the doctrine was not made explicit in subsequent commentaries until

May of 1962. Beginning at this time, several articles defined in more or less explicit terms the directive force of the doctrine over state policy. The article by General Lomov in the 8 May issue of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES described this relationship in some detail. "The principles of our doctrine," he said, "affect not only the sphere of military art--tactics, operative art, and strategy. They embrace also the construction of the Armed Forces, and the broad circle of state questions relating to the problem of war and peace as a whole."

Sidelnikov, in his 11 May article in RED STAR, made the same point in a somewhat narrower context: "In carrying out the function of consolidating the USSR defense and the combat power of the armed forces, our socialist state is guided by the tenets of Soviet military doctrine."

Finally, the article by Sinyagin in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES No. 14 stressed the relationship so emphatically that the conclusion seemed implicit that the whole range of Soviet policies affecting defense was subject to the direction of Soviet military doctrine.

Countercurrents, however, have also been present. In the military press treatments of the doctrine, there have been signs of sensitivity to the implication that military doctrine exerts a controlling influence on policy. In April, just as the new trend was getting under way, one author in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES (No. 9) seemed to be countering this notion in declaring that "there is not a single question of principle touching the strengthening of the power of the armed forces...which has been decided without the Central Committee of the party."

IV. THE MILITARY ROLE IN POLICY

By the summer of 1962 the new Soviet military doctrine had acquired a public character that had, in effect, elevated it from the sphere of military theory to the level of current state policy. Presented originally as a statement of official views related to the waging of a future war, the doctrine was now interpreted as a specific guideline for Soviet policy, prescribing the steps to be taken to prepare the country for the eventuality of war. Inherent in this evolution of the public presentation of the doctrine was a corresponding evolution in the image of the military leadership's role in policy formation.

In building up the political significance of the doctrine, the military press was at the same time building up a tacit claim for military authority in policy formation. For the doctrine was primarily a military product.

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The history of its evolution could be traced almost entirely within the boundaries of military theoretical literature. A half-year before the 22d party congress, Major General Zhilin, in an article in MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 5, 1961, had given an insight into the spirit of proprietorship which characterized the military approach to the development of the new military doctrine. Assigning the "political side" of the doctrine to the category of completed things, thanks in part to Khrushchev's 14 January 1960 speech, Zhilin urged the completion of the "military-technical part" of the doctrine. He referred in this connection to the "discussions that had more than once flared up on the pages of the military press and within the walls of the military academies of the General Staff and the M.V. Frunze institutions."

The task of completing the doctrine, Zhilin implied, was one which belonged entirely to the military itself. "It is completely obvious," he said, addressing his professional readers, "that the questions of working out Soviet military doctrine and the defining of its contents at the present turning-point in military affairs has great current significance."

The circumstances of the nuclear age, in which the special knowledge of the technical expert tends to elevate him from a mere executant of policy to an indispensable collaborator, have provided the Soviet military with ample opportunity to influence national policy. Yet the increased assertiveness of the military in this sphere appears to have derived less from personal political ambition than from the exigencies of the Soviet political situation. In pursuing its own professional interests on specific issues, the military has long been forced to assume a role in the political arena. Acting as a special interest group--enjoying influence at the highest levels of the regime, but dedicated to purposes distinct from those of the regime--the military has been in an advantageous position to exert pressure for policy decisions responsive to its special needs.

In the period since the 22d party congress military pressure in the policy sphere has apparently increased. The military hand may have been strengthened by the more optimistic estimates of relative U.S.-Soviet strength made public by U.S. political and military leaders beginning in the fall of 1961--estimates that would tend in the Soviet view to cast doubt on the reassuring picture Khrushchev had drawn in 1960 to support his defense reorganization policy, and hence to vindicate the stand of the military spokesmen who had expressed reservations about this policy. The political and psychological leverage afforded by this circumstance apparently emboldened the military to reinforce its voice in policy decisions through the methods of public agitation and argumentation when it felt in the spring of 1962 that its interests were threatened by the increasingly stringent economic situation.

The evidence considered in this report supports the conclusion that the new military doctrine announced by Malinovskiy, far from being a mere ratification of the ideas espoused by Khrushchev, in fact embodied different ideas. It shows that these new elements in the doctrine could be identified with viewpoints that had long been expressed by military spokesmen. It shows that the political implications of the doctrine have been elucidated in the military press at a time, and under conditions, which strongly suggested that they were being defined in order to influence policy toward the satisfaction of military interests. In sum, the evidence suggests that the military has used the new doctrine as a lever on national policy, pressuring it into directions best calculated to serve not only the military's concept of national interests, but the military's concept of its own interests as well.

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